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Bankruptcy Contracting Revised:
A Reply to Alan Schwartz's New Model
Lynn M. LoPuckil

In Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed,' Alan Schwartz purports to
restate and defend the bankruptcy contracting model he presented in A
ContractTheory Approach to Business Bankruptcy.2 What he in fact does is
abandon key assumptions of the original model and substitute new ones.
The resulting new model is driven by reputational constraints neither
present nor possible in the original model. Yet it works no better than the
original.
The linchpin of Schwartz's response is his insistence that his original
model contained an unstated assumption prohibiting debtor firms from
lying. In the context of Schwartz's model, the effect of the new assumption
is to bar the debtor from strategic behavior at the contracting stage-an
implausibility in the context of bankruptcy. To fit this new assumption to
his original model, Schwartz had to make new supporting assumptions that
he ultimately could not reconcile with the original model.
In addition, as Schwartz has filled in more of the details of his model,
other problems of inconsistency and incompleteness have come into sharper
focus. As will be apparent, Schwartz has not yet demonstrated the
feasibility of bankruptcy contracting in the real world or in his revised
model.
I. CREDITORS LENDING AT DIFFERENT TIMES

Schwartz's original model assumed that only the debtor firm had the
information necessary to determine the optimal bankruptcy contract
Schwartz devoted stage one of that model to showing that when all
t Security Pacific Bank Professor of Law. UCLA Law School. I thank Hulya Eraslan.
Frances Foster, Dan Keating, Ken Klee, Alan Schwartz, and Elizabeth Warren for comments on
earlier drafts. Responsibility for the accuracy of the final result is solely my own.
1. Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE LJ. 343 (1999).
2. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy. 107 YALE LJ. 1807
(1998).
3. See id. at 1828 n.59.
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creditors contracted with the debtor firm at the same time, the debtor firm
would propose that optimal contract. Schwartz set forth clearly the reason it
would do so: "The firm will offer creditors the contract that maximizes the
creditors' expected insolvency return because this will maximize the
amount the firm can borrow." 4 That is, the debtor firm offered the optimal
contract in response to direct economic incentives, not in order to comply
with an implicit assumption prohibiting lying.
At the second stage of his original model, Schwartz relaxed his
assumptions to acknowledge that creditors contract with their debtor firms
at different times and that the terms of the optimal bankruptcy contract
would change over time.' His solution at the second stage was a
"conversion term" in the debtor firm's contract with each creditor that
would change the bankruptcy terms of the creditor's contract to the
bankruptcy terms of any contract the debtor firm entered into with a later
creditor.
In my reply to Schwartz, I pointed out that his solution at the second
stage destroyed the incentives that had caused the debtor firm to propose
the optimal contract in the first stage. An opportunistic debtor firm could
understate the amount of the necessary bribe to get a favorable loan from
the initial creditor, knowing that it could correct the understatement in its
contract with the second creditor. This strategy of understatement would
enable the debtor firm to get below-market terms on the initial loan without
receiving a lower bribe in the event of bankruptcy. Because the initial
creditor would anticipate the strategy and have no way to prevent it, no loan
transaction could occur.
Schwartz does not dispute the devastating effect of the understatement
strategy on his model. Instead, he claims that the strategy "is ruled out by
[an] assumption" 7 that parties cannot "commit fraud" or "lie to each other
at the contracting stage." 8 Schwartz does not claim to have expressed this
assumption in his original essay. Instead, he asserts that it was implied
because "[c]ontract-theory models assume that parties will not engage in
fraud." 9
Schwartz cites no authority for that proposition. Nor is it generally true.
To the contrary, the introduction to a recently published contract theory text
cautions that "[a] homo economicus who possesses private information
should be expected to try to manipulate it, since he has in effect a monopoly
4. Id. at 1827.
5. See id. at 1833-34.

6. Id. at 1834.
7. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 349.
8. Id. at 350.
9. Id. at 349. Schwartz cites two articles in support of such a practice, but both expressly
assume that the parties must be truthful. He cites nothing to support an implicit assumption of no
fraud.
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over his own piece of private information.... The theory of contracts
originates in these failures of general equilibrium theory." "
Schwartz cites two articles in which the authors expressly assumed that
the contracting parties would be truthful," but it is equally easy to cite
articles in which the authors expressly assumed the contracting parties in
their models could lie.' More to the point, the authors Schwartz cites do
not make the no-lying assumption merely because it is a convention of
contract theory; they make it because it is plausible given the other
assumptions of their model.' 3 By contrast, Schwartz's original model
assumes that the private information (the private benefits) is
"unverifiable," making an assumption of truthful disclosure implausible.'*
Contrary to the claim he now makes, Schwartz's original essay
assumed that debtor firms could lie. To find that assumption in the original
essay, it is first necessary to understand the role that the no-lying
assumption plays in Schwartz's new model. The lie Schwartz would
prohibit is the debtor firm's "contractual promise to choose the optimal
bankruptcy system." 's Debtor firms did not, however, promise to choose

the optimal bankruptcy system in Schwartz's original model; they merely
"offer[ed] creditors a... contract that will induce the firm to choose the
optimal bankruptcy system in the event of insolvency." ,6 Schwartz implies
10. BERNARD SALANIIl, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER 2 (1997).
11. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 349 n.10.
12. See, e.g., Mathias Dewatripont, Renegotiationand Information Revelation over time: The
Case of Optimal Labor Contracts, 1989 Q.J. ECON. 589, 594-95 (" When [the output price for the
firm] is not observed by workers, the optimal contract... may not be feasible because the firm
may have an incentive to lie about [the output price]."); Roger B. Myerson, Incentive
Compatibility ad the Bargaining Problem, 47 ECONOMETRICA 61. 61 (1979) ("Of course, he
may ask his clients to tell him what he needs to know; but if he cannot compel truthful behavior
then he must anticipate that some group members may lie to him in an attempt to manipulate his
ultimate decision.").
13. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman, The hIformational Role of Warranties and Private
Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461. 465 (1981). For example, Grossman
explains, in a passage not cited by Schwartz: "We consider only truthful disclosures for two
reasons. First, we are interested in analyzing the benefits of a positive disclosure law which are
above and beyond those provided by a law against lying. Second, if there are zero ex post
verification costs, sellers would warranty their disclosures." Id.
14. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1824.
15. Schwartz, supra note I, at 349. In the context of the understatement strategy, the debtor
firm fulfills the promise Schwartz implies: It chooses optimally between reorganization and
liquidation. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bauzkruprcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE
L.J. 317, 325 (1999) ("Having borrowed on overly favorable terms that would not change, the
firm could then consolidate its gains by entering into a contract with the second creditor that fixed
the bribe at the optimal percentage." (footnote omitted)). For purposes of argument. howevver. I
assume that the debtor firm breaches the promise, as Schwartz asserts.
16. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1827 (emphasis added). Schwartz might reply that the creditors
would compel the debtor firm to reveal and warrant its hidden information, but if so, it is
incumbent on him to explain how that would occur. See infra text accompanying note 69. One
cannot simply assume that because the efficient result is in the interests of both parties, they can
overcome information imbalances to reach it. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 7heory of Default Rules, 99 YALE Li. 87, 127 (1989)
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both the promise 7 and its fraudulent nature from the mere fact that the
debtor firm contracts for a suboptimal bribe while it has the information
necessary to fix an optimal bribe.' 8 Because Schwartz implicitly assumes
that every debtor firm has that information, 9 it follows that any debtor firm
that proposes a suboptimal bankruptcy contract is "lying." The prohibition
on lying is a prohibition on proposing suboptimal terms.
Schwartz's original model contemplated that debtors could propose
suboptimal terms. After explaining the operation of his conversion term in
his original essay, Schwartz notes that "[a] possible objection to these
results is that, as regards the renegotiation-proof contract, the firm would
strategically not lower the optimal bribe s" in a contract with the later
creditor, though circumstances made a lower bribe efficient." 2 Although
that passage alone references a strategy of not contracting with the second
creditor at all, Schwartz later expands it to the creditor who does contract
with the second creditor:
The firm would also probably not behave strategically because the
behavior can be unprofitable. The gain to the firm from strategic
behavior is a higher bankruptcy payoff. The loss stems from the
firm's having to offer an inefficient contract to the second creditor,
thus not maximizing this creditor's insolvency payoff."'
Though the debtor firm in this passage knew it was offering a suboptimal
bribe 22 -and would have no opportunity to correct it later-Schwartz did
not protest the strategy as fraudulent. Consistent with the principles of his
original model,2 3 he claimed that the conduct would be controlled by his
model's pattern of incentives, finally concluding that "the expected costs to
the firm of offering later creditors inefficient contracts apparently would
often outweigh the gains." 24
Schwartz's claim that he intended the no-lying assumption is also
undermined by its omission from his extensive, detailed listing of

("[W]hen one party to a contract knows more than another, the knowledgeable party may
strategically decide not to contract around even an inefficient default. Because . . . contracting
around a default can reveal information, the knowledgeable party may purposefully withhold
information to get a larger piece of the smaller contractual pie.").
17. This assumption may or may not be justified. See supra note 16.
18. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1827-28.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 1834-35.
21. Id. at 1836 (emphasis added).
22. See id. at 1828 n.59 ("To clarify further what is going on, the firm can predict the private

benefits that it later may realize in bankruptcy and its expected monetary return. As a
consequence, the firm can calculate the optimal bribe s" to include in the contract.").
23. See supra text accompanying note 4.
24. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1836 (emphasis added).
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assumptions in the original essay' and his simultaneous inclusion of an
express assumption against collusion. 6 Collusion is a form of fraud.' The
exclusion of collusion from the model implies that other forms of fraud are
permitted.
The fact that Schwartz did not make the no-lying assumption in his
original model should not prevent him from making it in his new model.
But in doing so, he removes the elegant mechanism by which his original
model operated-incentives based on the monetary returns in his
formulae-and substitutes a new, inelegant mechanism-voluntary full
disclosure by the debtor in order to maintain the creditors' good will.
The original model, by contrast, contained no assumptions making it
necessary for the debtor to maintain the good will of its creditors. To
introduce them, Schwartz first correctly notes that the understatement
strategy requires that the debtor firm first propose a suboptimal contract to
the initial creditor and then propose an optimal contract to the last
creditor.' Schwartz then argues that when the debtor firm proposed the
optimal contract (at t'): (1) it would have to justify that change to the initial
creditor; 29 (2) the attempted justification would cause a loss of good will
with the initial creditor,0 (3) that loss would disadvantage the debtor firm
in a later workout or bankruptcy; 3' and (4) that disadvantage would be
sufficient to deter the debtor firm from using the strategy.
These assumptions are, in effect, the assumptions of a revised model.
They are both inconsistent with the original model and implausible. As to
the first assumption of the argument, the debtor firm would not have to
justify the change in contracts to the initial creditor because the initial
creditor would not know the change had occurred until after bankruptcy.
Recall that Schwartz's original model set forth no mechanism by which a
change in the bribe negotiated with the second creditor would be
communicated to the first.3 2 The design of such a mechanism in a proposed
real-world system of contract bankruptcy is not trivial. A large debtor firm
might have to notify tens or even hundreds of thousands of creditors.
Rasmussen proposed giving such notice through the debtor firms' corporate
25. Most of the assumptions are found in id. at 1822-26.
26. See id at 1826.
27. Black's Law Dictionary defines" collusion" as follows:
An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the
forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law. It implies the existence of fraud
of some kind, the employment of fraudulent means, or of lawful means for the

accomplishment of an unlawful purpose. A secret combination, conspiracy, or concert
of action between two or more persons for fraudulent or deceitful purpose.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 240 (5th ed. 1979).
28. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 348.

29. See id. at 350-51.
30. See id at 351-52.
31. Seeid at351.
32. See LoPucki, supra note 15, at 325.
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charters. In his original essay, Schwartz criticized Rasmussen's solution on

the ground that "corporate charters are inconvenient to amend"" and
proposed in its place a system that required no notice. Schwartz now
assumes that the initial creditor knows immediately of the change in

contracts, but does not tell us how.
To defend his second new assumption-that the debtor firm's inability
to justify its bribe change to the initial creditor would result in a loss of
good will-Schwartz begins by correctly observing the ambiguity of the

change: The debtor firm may be correcting for a deliberate understatement
the debtor firm made in contracting with the first creditor, or it may be

correcting for an intervening change in circumstances. 3 To resolve that
ambiguity in a way that loss of good will might follow, Schwartz again
alters the assumptions of his original model. His initial model, he concedes,

"assumed for convenience that the initial creditor.., might not be able to
observe private benefits at all . ... ,, 3 His new model instead assumes that
"[the initial] creditor likely can observe some elements of these benefits,

such as the salaries that the debtor's managers get." 36 In attempting to get
the initial creditor from there to the conclusion that the debtor firm is
correcting for a deliberate understatement, Schwartz draws two
questionable inferences. First, he infers that the initial creditor would know
the denominator of the bribe formula, [YL - y,], forcing the debtor firm to
explain the change as resulting from a change in the numerator, [b., bLj. 37 But under the assumptions of Schwartz's original model, the initial
creditor observes the expected monetary returns from bankruptcy [y] only
after the debtor is in bankruptcy-too late for it to affect the debtor's
reputation. 5 Schwartz's citations do not support his contrary assertion."
Before bankruptcy, the initial creditor would know none of the four values
33. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1811.
34. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 35 1.
35. Id. at351 n.16.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 351 n.15.
38. Specifically, Schwartz assumed that "[clreditors can prove in court how much money the
firm earned while in the bankruptcy system it chose (bankruptcy returns are 'verifiable'), and the
parties can observe the circumstances that exist ex post." Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1823. The
passage continues, "Thus parties know after insolvency which of the two bankruptcy systems
would maximize monetary returns." Id.
39. Schwartz claims in his response that his original model "assumed that creditors could
observe the expected monetary returns from the two systems" at the time of contracting.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 351. But in support of that claim he cites only formulas in his original
essay for calculating the expected return available to creditors and formulas for calculating the
"participation constraints" of creditors in an earlier article he wrote. See id. at 351 n. 15. Neither
source evidences an assumption that creditors could observe the expected bankruptcy returns at
the time of contracting as opposed to the actual returns at the time of bankruptcy. To the contrary,
in the earlier article Schwartz noted that "[project returns are verifiable, and the parties can
observe the realized state of the world, 0. Hence by [the time the firm chooses a bankruptcy
procedure] the parties know which procedure will maximize monetary profits." Alan Schwartz,
ContractingAbout Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 127, 131 (1997).
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used in calculating the bribe percentage, and therefore have no basis for
equating the change with a confession of lying. Second, Schwartz infers
that observing management's salaries before or during bankruptcy would
provide significant information regarding the appropriateness of the bribe
amount fixed in the contract with the initial creditor. ' But the
understatement strategy does not require the debtor firm to set or change
salaries differently. The sole target of that strategy was a super-optimal
bribe for choosing liquidation. If liquidation followed, the bribe would be
almost entirely in the form of a cash payment upon the debtor firm's filing
for liquidation;4" if the bribe even included salaries, they could be normal
salaries. If reorganization followed, the firm would obtain private benefits
that included salaries, but the observable salary component would be the
same amount the debtor firm would have paid the managers in the absence
of the strategy. Nor could the initial creditor learn anything of value by
comparing the salaries observed with the bribe specified in the initial
bankruptcy contract. The initial creditor has no way to know how much of
the private benefits were expected to derive from salaries.': It follows that
the initial creditor cannot detect the strategy by observing salary patterns.
Thus, even with Schwartz's change of assumptions, the initial creditor
would be unable to distinguish strategic changes in the bribe from
circumstance-driven changes.
Schwartz's third assumption, that the debtor firm needs the initial
creditor's good will in the event of a later workout or bankruptcy, 3 also
conflicts with assumptions of the original model. That model contemplated
no workouts, and the bankruptcy return was a function solely of the choice
40. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 351 n.16.
41. "The creditors then would pay the firm a sum to forgo the [Reorganization) system's
greater private benefits and instead enter liquidation." Id. at 346. The creditors make these cash
payments in return for the debtor firm's choosing Chapter 7 liquidation over reorganization. never
the reverse. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1825 (assuming that "the firm will always choose
system R unless it is constrained by ex ante contract or by ex post renegotiation"). Promptly after
the filing of a Chapter 7 case, the United States trustee is required to appoint a disinterested
trustee to replace the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 3 0 3 (g). 701(a)(1) (1994). Hence there is little
opportunity for the debtor firm to obtain private benefits in addition to the cash payment.
42. To illustrate, let z represent the amount of the salaries paid and observed in
reorganization, and let x represent the " pleasure or status derived from running the firm, the
excess consumption of leisure while employed and the opportunity to continue to be paid a
salary." Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1824. The private benefits would be b = z + x and the optimal
bribe percentage
s- (ZR +

x

,-R)-

(

'

L +xL)

(YLL + .v)L
The observed salaries, however, would be zx, an amount not even directly relevant in the fixing
of the optimal bribe. Even assuming that the observed z, was indicative of z,,, that would still
leave the initial creditor with grossly insufficient information to assess the appropriateness of the
bribe fixed in the initial bankruptcy contract.
43. The debtor firm would not lose good will if its prospects were good. because the debtor
firm would have no need to change the bribe.

The Yale Law Journal

(Vol. 109: 365

between reorganization and liquidation." This third assumption is also
implausible. In Schwartz's model, distributions in reorganization cases are
made strictly in accordance with Schwartz's version of absolute priority,
and the debtor firm is not even a participant in liquidation cases. 5 The
debtor firm would have no need for the creditor's good will.
Schwartz's fourth assumption-that the consequences of a loss of good
will would be sufficient to deter strategic behavior of the type I propose-is
similarly implausible. Although the debtor firm had to execute the
understatement strategy at the time it borrowed from the initial creditor, the
debtor firm could commence an almost equally effective version of the
strategy after it is in financial distress. To do so, the debtor firm would fix
the bribe excessively in its contract with the last lender. (I will refer to this
as the "overstatement strategy.") Schwartz placed no constraint on the time
of this last borrowing except that it had to occur prior to bankruptcy.46 Nor
did he require the extension of any minimum amount of credit. Presumably,
the debtor firm and the last lender could fix the bribe for all creditors in the
making of a $100 loan.47 Because a debtor firm using the overstatement
strategy proposes a higher bribe in the contract with the second creditor, the
debtor firm will receive the second loan on less favorable terms. But the
second creditor will adjust its credit terms for only its own pro rata share of
the higher bribe the creditors will pay at bankruptcy. The initial creditor,
who already lent on terms more favorable to the debtor firm, has no means
of recouping its pro rata share of the higher bribe.
Once one understands that the debtor firm can defeat Schwartz's
conversion term by raising the bribe in contemplation of bankruptcy, it
should also be apparent that debtor firms will not often be deterred by
reputational considerations. Scholars generally regard financial failure as an
end game in which reputational constraints of the type Schwartz now seeks
to rely upon are of little effect.48 Because reputational concerns would not
44. If the amounts of the monetary return or the private benefits were a function of the initial
creditor's good will, the debtor firm could not know them when it entered into the bankruptcy
contract. But if it did not, the debtor firm could not "calculate the optimal bribe s' to include in
the contract," Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1828 n.59, which is a function of them.
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46. If Schwartz were to attempt to add a prohibition on changes made shortly before
bankruptcy, debtor firms could be expected to anticipate the prohibition and make changes in the
bribe before it took effect. Furthermore, during the prohibition period the amount of the optimal
bribe might change, rendering the bankruptcy contract inefficient.
47. If Schwartz were to attempt to add an exception for small debts, he would be excluding a
class of creditors from the bankruptcy contract and find himself on a slippery slope. Debtor firms
would respond strategically by borrowing amounts just in excess of the limit. Another alternative
would be to borrow a substantial amount from a creditor who would lend on the eve of bankruptcy
because the debtor firm provided it with collateral. For bankruptcy contracting purposes. Schwartz
does not distinguish secured from unsecured creditors because he believes their interests do not
conflict in that regard. See Schwartz, supra note I,at 352.
48. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott. A Relational Theory of Secured Financing.86 COLM. L. RPV.
901, 924 (1986) ("Once business failure looms, market and reputational constraints recede as
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be sufficient to deter debtor firms from opportunistically proposing
suboptimal bankruptcy contracts, Schwartz's new assumption that they
cannot propose suboptimal contracts is implausible and his new model fails.
II. JUNIORISENIOR CONFLICT

In his original essay, Schwartz put forth the striking proposition that in
a bankruptcy regime that respected absolute priority, the interests of senior
and junior creditors would not conflict ex ante with respect to the choice
between reorganization and liquidation.49 As a result, both would prefer the
same bankruptcy contract, 0 and it would not matter which of them had the
power to fix it.
In Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, Schwartz specifies for the first
time how he reached that conclusion. In Schwartz's illustration, he assumes
that the average expected return from reorganization and the average
expected return from liquidation each appear to the contracting parties in
the form of single dollar amounts. This assumption is unrealistic because
contracting may take place years before bankruptcy when those amounts
necessarily would be uncertain. If we assume, more realistically, that the
average expected returns appear to the parties not as single amounts, but as
ranges of possible amounts, Schwartz's own illustration shows the
possibility of junior/senior conflict. That is, it will be in the interests of the
junior creditors to contract for suboptimal reorganization whenever the
average expected liquidation return exceeds the average expected
reorganization return (so that liquidation appears optimal), both
expectations are less than the seniors' claims (so that the juniors would
expect to recover nothing in either procedure), but the top of the range of
possible expected reorganization returns exceeds the expected liquidation
return (so that the juniors have some chance of recovery in
reorganization). 5'
The generalization can be illustrated as follows.5 At the time of
bankruptcy contracting [t°], the firm borrows $100 from senior creditors
and $200 from junior creditors. At that time [t'], the parties believe that, if
the debtor firm is faced with a choice between reorganization and
important factors restraining debtor misbehavior."); George G. Triantis. A Theory of the
Regulation of Debtor-in-PossessionFinancing, 46 VAND. L. REv. 901, 912 (1993) (stating that

when a firm is in financial distress, "the discipline imposed by contractual constraints and market
reputational norms becomes weaker as management and shareholders perceive their situation to
be increasingly an end game").
49. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1837-38.

50. See id
51. These are not the only conditions in which the juniors would favor a suboptimal

bankruptcy contract, but the conflict generated in these conditions is the easiest to understand.
52. This illustration is based on the one Schwartz provides. See Schwartz, supra note 1. at
353. I have made minor adjustments to it.

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 109: 365

liquidation at t', there will be a 100% chance that the average expected
monetary return from liquidation will be $100, a 90% chance that the
average expected monetary returns from reorganization will be $90, and a
10% chance that the average expected monetary returns from
reorganization will be $110. The possible value of $110 will result from the
existence at the time of bankruptcy [t'] of a 50% chance that the outcome in
reorganization will be $220 and a 50% chance that it will be zero.53 In these
circumstances, a contract that favors liquidation would be optimal because
the parties expect that at bankruptcy [t'] the average expected value of the
liquidation option ($100) will be higher than the average expected value of
the reorganization option ($92).54
Realizing, however, that they would recover nothing under the optimal
bankruptcy contract, the junior creditors would favor a contract that offered
a lower than optimal bribe. In a suboptimal reorganization, the unsecured
creditors would have a 10% chance of having a 50% chance of receiving a
distribution of $20 (.1 x .5 x $20 = $1). Because the junior creditors have
claims of $200 and the seniors claims of only $100, the juniors can outvote
the seniors and impose the suboptimal contract. 55 The suboptimality of the
junior creditors' choice might or might not be apparent to the court at
bankruptcy, but in a world where bankruptcy contracting was permitted,
that would not matter. The entire point of bankruptcy contracting is to
substitute the contract choice of procedure for the court's choice of
procedure. Considering only the reorganization option, the court would
respect absolute priority by giving the senior creditors debt in the face
amount of $200 with a 50% probability of payment ($200 x .5 = $100).
The junior creditors would receive stock with a value of $10 (a 50%
probability of $20 = $10). Because at the time of contracting [t' ] there is
only a 10% chance that the reorganization option will eventually have these
values, the possibility is worth only $1 to the unsecured creditors. But that
is enough to cause the junior creditors to prefer a bankruptcy contract that
provides for a suboptimal bribe.

III. TRADE/FINANCIAL CONFLICT
Schwartz's original model assumes that financial creditors share the
debtor firm's preference for an optimal bankruptcy choice, but that trade

53. The uncertainty whether the average expected return from bankruptcy will be $90 or $110
exists only at contracting. The parties expect that it will be resolved by the time of bankruptcy
such that it will be either $90 or $110. The uncertainty whether, if the expectancy is $110, the
reorganization will actually yield $220 or zero will remain at the time of bankruptcy, but be
resolved after bankruptcy.
54. (.9 X $90) + (.l x $110) = $92.
55. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 359 n.25.
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creditors might not because they "could earn more in new transactions with
the firm during the pendency of a wasteful reorganization." ' He realized
that if the bankruptcy contract required the agreement of all creditors, that
agreement might not be forthcoming. As his solution, he proposed to bind
the minority "to the bankruptcy bargain that the ex ante majority
prefer[s]." 5
A. Inconsistency Between Conversion and Majority Rule
My reply argued that permitting the majority of creditors to choose the
terms of the bankruptcy contract was inconsistent with permitting the
debtor firm to fix the terms in its contract with the last creditor.' Schwartz
responds cryptically:
It is unclear why he thinks an inconsistency would exist. Suppose,
for example, that a majority (in amount) of creditors sign the firm's
renegotiation-proof contract. If the law were to provide that the
preferences of a majority would control as regards bankruptcy, the
contractual terms in the firm's contracts with these creditors would
become required terms in the firm's contracts with the remaining
5
creditors. Hence, the firm's credit contracts would be consistent.
Schwartz's statement is correct as far as it goes. But he apparently fails to
realize the implications of majority rule for his scheme of contract updating.
From the moment that the preferences of a majority fix the bankruptcy
contract's terms for all creditors, the debtor firm's contracts with individual
creditors can no longer update the bankruptcy contract. Because the optimal
bankruptcy contract varies over time, 6 Schwartz's model needs a new
updating mechanism. Recontracting periodically with the majority might be
prohibitively expensive, 61 but Schwartz offers no alternative mechanism.
B. Inefficiency in Majority Rule
Schwartz seems to acknowledge that if trade creditors who "could earn
more in... a wasteful reorganization" 62 were in the majority, the majority
might prefer bankruptcy contracts that would result in a wasteful
reorganization. He nevertheless concludes that "majority rule contracts
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1838.
Id
See LoPucld, supra note 15, at 330.
Schwartz, supranote 1, at 360 n.28.
See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1833.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1838.
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would be efficient either automatically or because of the firm's actions." 6- 1
He explains that when the trade creditors were in the minority, " [t]he firm
would contract out of this inefficiency ... by refusing to offer any creditor
a renegotiation-proof contract." 64 When the trade creditors were in the
majority, "the firm could obtain sufficiently good terms from the financial
creditors by offering the optimal bankruptcy contract to permit the firm to
induce the trade creditors to sign also." 65 Thus, the majority's preference
never determines the choice between reorganization and liquidation; the
parties always contract out of the majority's preference to the optimal
choice. Why, then, provide for majority rule in the first place? Schwartz
does not say.'
The deus ex machina in this happy drama is Schwartz's assumptions
that (1) the debtor firm knows what bankruptcy contract is optimal and (2)
the debtor firm must offer that contract. The only task then remaining is to
determine the appropriate amounts of the bribes necessary to cause the
creditors to accept the contract. Schwartz assumes with regard to the
trade/financial conflict, as he did with regard to the junior/senior conflict,67
that the debtor firm can fix the bribes optimally even though the creditors
with conflicts do not have a direct contract with one another.68
The mere fact that it is in the interests of the parties to reach agreement
does not, however, mean that they can or will reach agreement. Were
consistent interests sufficient to imply a contract, contract theory would be
unnecessary. To illustrate, it was in the aggregate interests of the parties in
Schwartz's original model that the debtor firm make the optimal choice
between reorganization and liquidation. Schwartz did not simply conclude
that the debtor firm would therefore impose the optimal contract and
arrange the appropriate bribes. He wrote his essay because he realized that
it was necessary to describe the incentive mechanisms by which the parties
would overcome information- and transaction-cost problems to reach the
Coasean bargain. As one commentator has put it:
The basic insight of mechanism theory is that incentive constraints
should be considered equally with resource constraints in the
formulation of the economic problem. In situations where
63. Schwartz, supra note 1,at 361.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Majority rule might confer leverage on the majority that would enable it to extract bribes.
thus effecting a transfer of wealth to it. But the transfer of wealth would be smaller and the
transaction costs less if the last contract were to govern instead. Under the latter rule, the debtor
firm would have to bribe only one creditor to accept the optimal contract. Alternatively, Schwartz
may expect that majority rule will reduce transaction costs.
67. See Schwartz, supra note I, at 359.
68. See id. at 361. Schwartz carefully avoids proposing direct contracts between creditors in
both circumstances, probably because he realizes that the transaction costs would be massive.
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individuals' private information and actions are difficult to monitor,
the need to give people the incentive to share information and exert
efforts may impose constraints on economic systems just as much
as the limited availability of raw materials.'
In Schwartz's new model, the debtor firm must propose not only the bribe it
will receive in the event of bankruptcy; it also must propose the bribes that
the majority trade creditors will receive for entering into the bankruptcy
contract. The problem is that the debtor firm does not have the information
it needs to fix the latter bribes. Each trade creditor presumably could "earn
more in a wasteful reorganization," but how much more would depend on
the individual creditor's circumstances. To complete his model, Schwartz
needs to specify the contract mechanism by which the debtor firm would
acquire that information.
If Schwartz were to devise such a mechanism for his model, he would
still need an additional step to translate his solution to the real world. The
trade creditor/financial creditor conflict present in his model is
representative of a much wider variety of creditor conflicts existing in the
real world. Trade creditors are not alone in having extrinsic interests that
would prevent them from supporting the optimal contract; virtually every
other kind of creditor has them as well. Bondholders, who typically are
contractually bound to a fixed rate of interest for ten years or more, might
favor an ill-advised liquidation so they could recover the face amount of
their bonds and reinvest them at current rates. A bank lender might favor an
ill-advised reorganization for the same reason that trade creditors would:
Reorganization would preserve a profitable relationship in which the bank
had already made a firm-specific investment. So might employee-creditors.
Financial creditors might want to stay in or get out because they had too
much or too little liquidity to satisfy themselves or their regulators. Even
within a category of creditors, individual interests would be diverse: One
creditor might be too liquid while another might be insufficiently so. A
sound solution cannot count on any creditor's interest to be identical to the
interests of the group as a whole and hence cannot count on any creditor
support for the optimal bankruptcy contract. To complete his model,
Schwartz needs a contract mechanism that would enable the debtor firm to
fix, years before bankruptcy, and to adjust periodically, the appropriate
amounts of transfer payments to and from each individual creditor to cause
the creditors to favor the optimal bankruptcy contract.

69. Roger B. Myerson, Mechanism Design, in THE NEw PALGRAVE
INFORMATION AND MARKETS

191, 191 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In his original essay, Alan Schwartz claimed to have proven bankruptcy
contracts feasible even though there are multiple creditors who lend at
different times and have potentially conflicting interests. In my reply to that
essay, I showed that the understatement strategy could defeat the
conversion term Schwartz used to update the bankruptcy contract when
creditors lend at different times. In Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed,
Schwartz introduced a new assumption that debtor firms cannot lie. In
context, that meant that they could propose only optimal contracts. That
new assumption would block the debtor firm from using the understatement
strategy, and thereby, he hoped, rehabilitate his model.
Schwartz attempted to justify this new assumption with the argument
that reputational concerns would deter debtor firms from proposing
suboptimal contracts. But as he spun out the "justifications" for the new
assumption, he was, in effect, adding them to his model as assumptions.
Treating them as such, it becomes apparent that the new assumptions
conflict with assumptions and mechanisms of his original model. The
resulting new model is internally inconsistent and, as a result, fails to
provide incentives that would cause the debtor firm to propose the optimal
contract.
Nor does Schwartz's new model provide creditors with incentives to
accept the optimal contract. To deal with the conflict between senior and
junior creditors, Schwartz erroneously concluded that strict enforcement of
absolute priority would eliminate it. To deal with the conflict between trade
and financial creditors, Schwartz initially proposed a regime of majority
rule. In my initial reply, I pointed out that majority rule was inconsistent
with the non-majoritarian "conversion" process that Schwartz's model
used as an updating mechanism. In his response, Schwartz kept majority
rule but did not provide an updating mechanism for the majority-rule
regime.
Having kept majority rule and admitted that the trade creditors would
sometimes be in the majority and prefer a suboptimal contract, Schwartz
proposed to avoid the obvious conclusion-the majority would vote for a
suboptimal bankruptcy contract-by proposing a Pareto-optimal deal in
which the debtor would bribe the trade creditor majority to vote for the
optimal contract instead. The proposed deal suffers from two analytical
shortcomings. First, because the parties always contract out of majority rule
when it matters, majority rule ceases to serve any apparent function in the
model. Second, Schwartz failed to specify the mechanism by which the
parties would fix the amounts of these newly contemplated bribes.
Schwartz's original model made the unrealistic assumption that the
debtor firm knew, years before bankruptcy, the returns that the debtor firm
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would earn in bankruptcy and the value of the private benefits management
would enjoy. His new model added the assumption that debtors would not
lie. The two assumptions combined make it impossible for the debtor to
propose suboptimal bankruptcy contracts to creditors, even when they have
economic incentives to do so. Even if Schwartz's new model had worked,
the implausibility of these assumptions would have prevented it from
constituting a solution to the problem of bankruptcy contracting. As it is,
Schwartz fails to demonstrate the feasibility of bankruptcy contracting in
his model or in the real world.
Schwartz's failure to prove bankruptcy contracting feasible does not
prove it infeasible. Given the strong preference of law and economics
scholars for a contract solution to the bankruptcy problem, it is inevitable
that others will attempt to do what he could not. Schwartz may have found
an effective first step when he chose to attempt to prove that bankruptcy
contracting could work a single improvement-an optimal choice between
reorganization and liquidation-at nominal expense, without causing any
detriment. If scholars could prove that a bankruptcy contract would best the
state-supplied system in a single respect and adopt the state-supplied system
in every other respect, they would prove the contract regime better on the
whole. Schwartz's efforts have, however, proven that the task will not be as
easy as it may have appeared at first.

